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Abstract: Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to 
Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective 
Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no 
collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second 
is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of 
the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole 
agency requirement). The third, is that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, 
is not satisfied if you don’t do it yourself. On the first point, I grant that Blomb-
erg identifies an important distinction between simple and composite actions the 
book did not take into account, but argue it doesn’t show that there are collective 
actions in the same sense there are individual actions. On the second point, I 
argue from examples that the collective reading of plural action sentences doesn’t 
entail the distributive reading, which requires the sole agency requirement on 
singular action sentences. This settles the third point, since it entails that if you 
intend to build a boat, you are successful only if you are the only agent of it in the 
sense required by the verb. 
Keywords: Collective action; Shared intention; Singular action sentences; Plural 
action sentences; Logical form.
1  Introduction
Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural 
Agency (Ludwig 2016). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense 
in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences 
entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action 
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verb in the way required by that verb. The third, connected with the second, is 
that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, is not satisfied if you don’t do 
it yourself, e.g. if you build the front half and someone else builds the back half.
2   Are There Collective Actions?
Some of the differences between Blomberg and me on collective action appear 
more verbal than substantive. But I think that Blomberg brings to light an impor-
tant issue in thinking about primitive actions and their composites that I did not 
take fully into account.
I did not place much emphasis on the concept of an action in the book. Asking 
what someone did is not like asking what someone kicked. We answer the latter 
question by supplying a noun phrase that picks out the thing kicked. We answer 
the former but supplying an action sentence. My view is that all the substantive 
logical and conceptual questions about the truth conditions for action sentence 
are answered when we have an account of their logico-semantic form and an 
analysis of the agency relation. If pressed to say what were someone’s acts, I sug-
gested that we focus on what he does but not by doing anything else. Following 
Davidson, I called such actions primitive actions (Davidson 2001). In my analysis 
of action sentences, I identified this as the value of the variable that appears in 
the agency relation in the representation of the logic form of the action sentence. 
Thus, for [1] whose logical form we can roughly represent in [1a],
[1] I built a boat
[1a] There is an e, there is an f, there is a time t earlier than now, such that
(i) I am an agent of f at t,
(ii) f brings about e directly,1
(iii) only I am an agent of any f ′ at any t ′ that brings about e directly and
(iv) e is a boat building,2
1 As Blomberg notes, “directly” expresses a requirement imposed by the action verb that f lead 
to e without going primarily through the agency of another. If I hire a you to build a boat for me, 
I am an agent of its building but did not build it myself. “x brings about y” means x makes a con-
tribution to y’s occurrence, since typically other conditions have to be in place for things we bring 
about directly to lead to other changes.
2 Note that in clause (iv) “is a boat building” is to be understood to strip out the implication that 
the event came about because of anything that any agents did.
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the agent’s primitive actions (with respect to his boat buildings in the past) are 
just the values of “f ” that make the sentence true for values of “e” (the conse-
quent events) and “t ”. The relation expressed by “x is an agent of f at t” I called 
primitive agency. I am an agent in an extended sense of anything that what I 
am a primitive agent of brings about in turn. Thus, if in moving my finger, I pull 
a trigger, fire a gun, and kill someone, I am an agent of his death, though not 
primitively, since I brought about his death by way of standing in the primitive 
agency relation to a distinct event, the movement of my finger. The movement of 
the trigger, the firing of the gun, the death of my victim, are all downstream from 
the finger movement.
Plural action sentences like [2] are ambiguous between a distributive and col-
lective reading.
[2] We built a boat.
The distributive reading is given in [2d]. In [2d] the matrix receives the analysis in 
[1a] with “x” substituted for “I”, as shown in [2d′].
[2d] Each x of us is such that x built a boat.
[2d′] Each x of us is such that:
there is an e, there is an f, there is a time t earlier than now, such that
(i) x is an agent of f at t,
(ii) f brings about e directly,
(iii) only x is an agent of any f ′ at any t ′ that brings about e directly and
(iv) e is a boat building.
The collective reading in contrast says not that each of us built a boat but that we 
built a boat together.3 The distributive reading does not entail the collective, or 
vice versa. Blomberg disputes the second independence claim, which we return 
to below. I argued that the collective reading derives from giving the quanti-
fier over the consequent event e wide scope with respect to the quantifier over 
members of the group and adjusting clause (iii) to restrict the agents of the event 
to members of the group. This is given in [2c].
3 Blomberg initially glosses this, for “We built a house”, as “There was one house such that all of 
us built it”, but what’s important is not that one house was built by all of us but that there’s one 
house-building we all contributed to. This is clear in the case of “There was one bench that all of 
us lifted” which would be true if we each individually lifted it seriatim but not together. Similarly, 
the house might come in a kit. We each build it and then take it apart so the next can practice her 
house building skills. Then “There was one house such that all of us built it” is true though we 
did not build a house together.
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[2c] There is an e such that each x of us is such that:
there is an f, there is a time t earlier than now, such that
(i) x is an agent of f at t,
(ii) f brings about e directly,
(iii) only y among us are such that y is an agent of any f ′ at any t ′ that brings 
about e directly and
(iv) e is a boat building.
This says that all of us and no one else contributed directly to bringing about one 
and the same boat building. Everything about what the account claims is made 
plain in [2c].
Why say that there are no collective actions? For individuals, actions are what 
they stand in the primitive agency relation to. In [2c] only individuals stand in the 
primitive agency relation to any events. So the group does not stand in the primi-
tive agency relation to anything. There is no group action in the sense in which 
there are individual actions.
Blomberg disputes this–or does he? He does not disagree with the claim 
that the group does not stand in the primitive agency relation to any event. 
What does the disagreement come to? He puts it this way in his conclusion 
(labels added):
(a) Ludwig construes individual and collective action as much more different in nature and 
ontological status than they really are. (b) First, he chooses to define “collective primitive 
action” in way that only makes sense in the light of a mistaken group agent account of 
collective action; then draws the conclusion that there are no collective primitive actions. 
(c) However, in the light of his own multiple agent account, there is a perfectly intelligible 
sense in which there can be collective primitive actions. (d) Furthermore, as a matter of 
empirical fact, it is arguably plausible that many of us sometimes perform such collective 
primitive actions. (p. 23)
(b) Gives a somewhat misleading impression of my discussion. I asked whether 
groups perform primitive actions in the sense in which individuals do. I said no in 
one sense (does not stand in the agency relation) and yes in another (does some-
thing but not by doing anything else), and I claimed the former was the primary 
sense (Ludwig 2016, p. 173–174). I was not offering an eliminativist account, as 
Blomberg claims (p. 4, 5, 9). This suggests that I was acknowledging that we 
thought there was such a thing as collective primitive action and had something 
definite in mind, and that I was arguing that contrary to popular belief there is 
no such thing. I don’t think “collective primitive action” has an everyday use or 
that there is a common sense view about it. So far as (c) and (d) go, I agree with 
both! There is a perfectly intelligible sense in which there can be collective primi-
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tive actions: what groups do but not by doing anything else. And I agree that we 
sometimes perform collective primitive actions in this sense. I said, “the mereo-
logical sum of the primitive contributions of the group’s member may count in 
an extended, or secondary, sense as the group’s primitive action” (p. 174). It 
is the characterization of this as “an extended or secondary” sense that is the 
bone of contention. So the central charge is (a): I fail to acknowledge important 
similarities between what individuals and groups do that grounds the claim that 
there are collective primitive actions in “the primary and non-derivative sense” 
(p. 10, 13, 14, 17).
Blomberg pursues two lines of argument. First, he argues by way of examples 
that there are collective actions. Second, he argues that my discussion of primi-
tive actions focuses too narrowly on simple actions and that once we take into 
consideration composite actions, we see that when, e.g. we build a boat together, 
there is something that is a collective action “in the primary sense.”
2.1   Argument by Example
Blomberg discusses two examples. The first is the execution of a complicated 
dance move by two figure skaters. The second is the case of the two Siamese twins 
who have joint control over an arm, which I discuss in the book.
Blomberg claims that when pair skaters perform a skilled dance move, e.g. a 
pair spin combination, they are performing a joint primitive action. Their move-
ments are controlled by their intentions-in-action but many of the details are 
below the level of intentional direction. “If anything is entitled to the label ‘collec-
tive primitive action’,” Blomberg writes, “it would arguably be such a joint move” 
(p. 6). Why?
Blomberg cites an earlier paper (Blomberg 2011). In that paper, Blomberg 
argues first that intentions-in-action can be directed not just at changes in one’s 
body but also at technological extensions of one’s body. Then he argues that 
this can be extended in some cases to movements of the bodies of others in the 
context of joint action so that each has intentions-in-action direct toward their 
movements together. I want to grant that intentions-in-action can in principle 
be directed at changes other than changes in one’s biological body. This is clear 
from the possibility of a prosthetic that comes to function like a biological limb 
from the point of view of the agent. Perhaps, as Blomberg suggests, the cane for 
someone who is blind could analogously become transparent to its user, and 
similarly other technological extensions of the body’s reach like an exoskeleton 
or remote manipulator, though this is less clear. A complication in extending this 
to the idea that one can have an intention-in-action directed at something that 
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is not a part of one’s body (as opposed to one’s biological body) is that plausibly 
what counts as a part of one’s body is whatever one can bring about a change in 
without mediation by other actions. Then if the cane of the blind man is some-
thing change in which is conceived like moving a finger, it becomes for that time 
of use a part of his body. This is a functional rather than biological definition of 
the body.
Can this idea extend to the skaters doing a pair spin combination? It seems to 
me that it cannot because of the structure of their participatory intentions. Each 
has his or her job to do. It requires often that the other is at that time doing her job. 
But each has a plan to make a contribution to their doing something together in 
accordance with a shared joint action plan. The shared joint action plan specifies 
the roles for each. The roles are (often) different though interlocking. Each per-
forms and trains for his or her own role. So the distinction between each agent’s 
own actions and the other’s and what they do together is built into the content of 
their intentions. This is important because keeping in view the other as a distinct 
agent is important for the mutual responsiveness required for success, for one 
does not control the other’s actions but must rather be ready to adjust one’s own 
in the light of feedback about what the other is doing. There is an important dif-
ference between using a tool or moving a prosthetic limb and doing something 
intentionally with someone else. It comes out in one’s conceiving of the other as 
performing her own actions. Thus, when I do something with someone else, I do 
not conceive of her body as an extension of my own.
In the present paper, Blomberg emphasizes that the pair of skaters have a 
joint skill that they can exercise together which neither has alone. The individual 
skills involved themselves (often) cannot be expressed without the other express-
ing his or her corresponding skill. Just as the expression of a skill for individual 
action is expressed in the first instance in a primitive action, by parity of reason-
ing the expression of a skill for a joint action is expressed in the first instance in 
a joint primitive action.
But it is not obvious that the expression of group skills issues in joint primi-
tive actions. We need to have an independent characterization of a primitive 
action in order to determine whether when two people have individual skills that 
interlock in the production of skilled joint action there is a joint primitive action. 
There seem to be three options. First, it is what is done but not by doing anything 
else. Second, it is the event that they stand in the primitive agency relation to as 
a group. Third, it is the event (if any) that they each stand in the primitive agency 
relation to. If the first, I agree they perform a primitive action, though appeal to 
skill drops out of the picture. If the second, they do not, and I think Blomberg 
agrees. If the third, they do not, as they are primitive agents only of their own 
movements.
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The fact that we can’t express skills we have that contribute to the expres-
sion of a joint skill outside the context of joint action does not show that they 
are not individual. There are many things we can do primitively but not without 
props. I can’t make move my fingers as I do when I tie my shoelaces without the 
shoelaces. A gymnast cannot express his skills on the pommel horse without the 
apparatus. I cannot walk across the room without the floor. Similarly, I cannot 
shake someone’s hand alone. I cannot wrestle by myself. So the fact that some 
skills can be expressed only in coordination with others with corresponding or 
complementary skills does not show that joint skills cannot be analyzed in terms 
of skills of individuals.
Blomberg says “Joint skills would have to be underpinned by joint primitive 
action procedures” that operate subpersonally” (p. 7). But in what sense is there 
a joint primitive action procedure beyond there being a pair of complementary 
individual primitive action procedures which each can exercise effectively only 
when the other is exercising hers? On the face of it, that is all that is going on. So 
there is not a joint primitive action procedure in the same sense in which there 
are individual primitive action procedures. We are back to the question whether 
two people exercising their own primitive action procedures (i.e. skills) in concert 
ipso facto perform a primitive action together.
Blomberg also discusses my case of the Siamese Twins who share an arm. 
When they each intend to raise it and do so, they raise it together. He says that 
this is a counterexample to my claim that “when a group does something, there is 
no agent that has an intention-in-action that is directed at what the group does” 
(p. 8). Blomberg notes I say things like the following: “When groups act, no agent 
stands in the primitive agency relation to anything to which the multiple agents 
bear the agency relation” (Ludwig 2016, p. 297). He’s right that the twin case is a 
counterexample. I wrote myself about the twins case: “… to be a primitive agent 
of an event one must have a de re intention-in-action directed at it, and while each 
of the twins has a de re intention-in-action directed at what they are doing, the pair 
of them as such does not, and so the pair does not figure in the primitive agency 
relation as such” (175; emphasis added). I should have qualified what I said in 
other contexts. In cases other than those in which people share control over parts 
of the same body, when groups act, no agent stands in the primitive agency rela-
tion to the events to which the multiple agents bear the agency relation. The twins 
case shows that it is conceptually possible for more than one individual to stand 
in the primitive agency relation to the same event and to have a de re intention in 
action directed at it. Is there a joint primitive action in this case in a more robust 
sense than in the typical joint action? As I said in the book, it narrows the gap. 
But this unusual case is not an appropriate model for collective action in general. 
Blomberg suggests via the analogy with tool use that the pair skaters dance move 
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is like this.4 But, on the face of it, each performs and controls his or her own part 
in what they do, and their de re intentions-in-action are and ought to be directed 
at their own actions.
2.2   Simple and Composite Actions
The second line of argument is independent of the first and has broader scope.
Blomberg distinguishes, in the individual case, between simple and compos-
ite actions. A simple action is an event that an agent brings about primitively (that 
event may itself be complex, but still in the relevant sense a simple action). But 
there are complex actions which consist of distinct of primitive actions. There 
are two cases of complex actions to consider. First, there are primitive actions 
that compose another primitive action toward which I have a contemporaneous 
intention-in-action. Second, there are primitive actions that compose a complex 
action that is not as such the target of a contemporaneous intention-in-action.
The first is illustrated by my clapping my hands. Clapping my hands consists 
in moving my right arm and my left arm. These are distinct primitive actions. If 
one arm were paralyzed unbeknownst to me, the other arm would still move at 
my intention. But the clapping, which consists in the movement of both my arms, 
is also in a sense a primitive action. I bring it about directly, and intend it de re, 
though it is composed of two distinct primitive actions (at least). Likewise when 
typing, the fingers of each hand move independently of the other. The ensemble 
of movements is a primitive action in the sense in which clapping is, as well as 
at least some of the movements that compose those. I intend the movements of 
the left hand de re and of the right de re, but also the ensemble of the two. There 
are also ensembles of diachronic movements that can count as primitive actions 
in the same sense, that is, towards which an intention-in-action is directed, for 
example, tying an Alpine butterfly loop or typing a sentence.
In what sense is the ensemble a primitive action as well as its components? 
When I clap my hands, I do so by moving my left hand and by independently 
moving my right hand. Does not this fail the test of being something I do but not 
by doing anything else? Strictly speaking, yes. So this shows that that test needs 
4 Support might be found in Abe Roth’s idea (Roth 2004) that in joint action we can act on the 
intentions of others in the same sense normatively that we act on our own, as when I act on your 
intentions when I am driving and you are navigating. The thought would be that I act on my own 
intention-in-action with respect to my movements and you on yours when we act intentionally 
together but we each also act on the other’s intention-in-action at the same time so that (it might 
be argued) there is a sense in which we act on de re intentions directed at each of the primitive 
actions that contribute to the collection of primitive actions by which we do what we do.
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refinement. The sense in which the ensemble is clearly a primitive action in these 
cases is that it can be the target itself of a de re intention-in-action.
The second case is illustrated by projects like building a house that are 
extended in time. If I build a house, I bring about the coming together of the 
materials into a house by a sequence of primitive actions over an extended period 
interrupted by sleep and other activities. As Blomberg notes, there is no one 
intention-in-action directed at the whole ensemble as opposed to various inten-
tions-in-action directed at parts of it. However, as Blomberg also notes, these 
ensembles are the sorts of things that I allow to be values of the variable “f ” in 
my account of the logical form of action sentences.
Thus, I have given three criteria for being a primitive action which are not 
coextensive:
C1. what we bring about but not by bringing about anything else;
C2. what are the targets of our intentions-in-action;
C3. what are the truth-making values of the event argument (values of “f ”) in 
the agency relation.5
C3 includes the events that C1 and C2 do, C2 includes the events that C1 does, but 
C1 does not include all the events C2 or C3 do, and C2 does not include all the 
events C3 does. I’ll call events meeting C1 simple primitive actions, those meeting 
C2 but not C1 complex primitive actions, and those meeting C3 but not C1 or C2 
composite primitive actions (i.e. composites of primitive actions).6 See Figure 1. I’ll 
use the unmodified term “primitive action” to cover all three, and since I endorse 
the view that actions are the values of the “f ” variable, I will also use the term 
“action” to cover all three. I will then also speak of simple, complex and compos-
ite actions. The need to make and keep track of these distinctions is something 
I was not clear about in the book and I am grateful to Blomberg’s discussion for 
bringing this to light.
5 Once we draw these distinctions, we might convert “there is an f ” to “there are fs”, in the ac-
count of the logical forms of action sentences, allow the variable’s values to include single and 
multiple events, and stick with an agency relation that requires values of “f ” to meet C2 or C1. 
This modification may require the least verbal revision of my discussion because it is easy to rein-
terpret the agency relation to suit. For present purposes, I pursue the alternative of allowing “f ” 
to take on values that involve composites of events toward which we direct intentions-in-action. 
It is not clear that data about usage can settle the question one way or another.
6 Blomberg refers to these as actions but not as primitive actions. They satisfy C3 and so meet 
one of the criteria which I used to classify events as primitive actions but they do not meet the 
other two. My terminology is a bit of a compromise since I define “composite primitive action” as 
“composite of primitive actions”, which rests an independent notion of primitive action given by 
C1 and C2. There isn’t a substantive difference between us on this.
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This idea that a composite of primitive actions may also be an action is central 
to Blomberg’s second line of argument that there is a notion of a collective action 
which is not merely a façon de parler. The suggestion is that once we see that 
in the case of individuals, actions can be composed out of simple and complex 
actions, we can see that there is no reason to resist the principle that actions may 
be composed out of the simple and complex primitive actions of more than one 
individual. Call this the General Action Composition Principle. For generality, 
suppose primitive actions that compose another action are restricted to events 
that stand in some relation R (left as a placeholder).
General Action Composition Principle
For any simple primitive actions, α1, α2, … αn that stand in relation R, there is an action 
which is their sum.
Is the General Action Composition Principle true? Call a sum of simple actions 
that stand in R an R-sum. Let us suppose that an R-sum of any of an individual’s 
simple actions is also an action of his. It is true that this has in common with the 
R-sum of any number of simple actions of two or more agents that it is an R-sum 
of primitive actions. But it does not follow in general that a concept that applies 











What is the object of a
de re intention-in-action.
What is done but not by
doing anything else.
Fig. 1: Three Rings of Action.
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a set of things of the same kind associated with more than one individual. For 
example, the sum of the cells of my body at any time is a human being, but a of 
sum of cells from different human bodies at any time is not a human body. The 
sum of the moments of my life is a human life, but a sum of moments in differ-
ent human lives is not a human life. The question is whether “primitive action” 
should gather not just sums of the primitive actions of particular individuals, but 
primitive actions in general. That they are both R-sums of primitive actions does 
not settle the question.
In the case of an individual, any R-sum of her simple actions involves events 
which are minimally unified in their simple components being brought about primi-
tively by one and the same agent, which is why it is suitable to be the value of the 
variable “f ” in our representation of the logical form of singular action sentences. 
Putting aside recherché cases like the Siamese twins, in the case of an R-sum select-
ing from simple actions of each member of a group of agents, this is not true. There 
is no agent with respect to whom the sum of primitive actions performed by its 
members meets this condition. This is why it seems right to say that there is no agent 
of what the group does in the sense in which there is an agent of what an individual 
does and no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions.
Blomberg says: “Were Ludwig faithful to his own multiple agents account 
and to common sense, he ought to say that there are collective (primitive) actions 
in the primary sense, or at least that such primitive actions are possible” (p. 
8). I don’t think that common sense (in the sense of what is generally believed 
among ordinary people) has a verdict on this matter. “Primitive action” is a bit of 
philosophical jargon. “Collective action” is used loosely and in a variety of ways, 
often with a narrower sense that philosophers have in mind, and when used in 
a general sense is simply a proxy for what groups of people do together. So there 
is not a common sense view on the use of this expression to get at what philoso-
phers are interested in. My multiple agents account, expressed in [2c], is silent on 
the use of “collective primitive action” and “collective action”, though it gives a 
complete account of what is going on. This is one reason I don’t think the ques-
tion of what collective actions are is itself of much theoretical interest.
In the book I said that if a singular action sentence like [1] is true, then there 
is some description under which the action is intentional, but the same is not true 
of a plural collective action sentence such as [2], that is, the group that builds 
a boat need not have done anything that is intentional under any description. 
Blomberg argues that there are things that individual agents do which are not 
intentional under any description. Thirty years ago I moved my left index finger. 
Yesterday I moved my right index finger. If the sum of those events is something 
I did, then there is no description under which what I did is intentional. That 
is right, and it is a good point. It shows that I overstated the case for individual 
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action. Not every event which is an action of mine (allowing their sums to be 
actions) is intentional under some description. However, the underlying point 
was that in the case of individual action, the source of any form of agency lies 
in things individual agents do intentionally. It remains true that if an individual 
did something, then the individual did one or more things that were intentional 
under some description or descriptions that explains why it was something he 
did. It is not true that if a group did something, it did one or more things that are 
intentional under some description or descriptions. As I wrote in the book, “It is 
therefore possible for a group to do something without doing anything intention-
ally” (p. 176). It is not possible for any individual agent to do something without 
doing anything intentionally.
Where does this leave us? These are things that Blomberg and I agree on.
1. The sums of an individual’s simple primitive actions (or some subset of those 
sums) are themselves actions.
2. The truth conditions of plural collective action sentences involve only indi-
viduals standing in the agency relation to actions.
3. When any group acts, there is a sum of the different member agents’ simple 
primitive actions that contribute to what the group does.
What we seem to disagree on is whether “action” or “primitive action” should be 
used for the sums involved in 3 in addition to those in 1, or whether, if used, it is 
used in “the primary sense.” I submit that this is largely a verbal rather than a 
substantive disagreement. A disagreement is verbal when you agree about all the 
facts but disagree about how to use a word in relation to those facts. There might 
be an empirical issue about ordinary usage, but in this case I think ordinary usage 
does not settle the issue. It is up to us as theorists to judge how best to use “collec-
tive primitive action.” I emphasize the differences between individual and group 
agency to throw the mechanisms of collection agency into relief. Blomberg wants 
to emphasize similarities between extended ensembles of individual actions and 
ensembles of actions of distinct individuals. I don’t find myself moved. But I don’t 
see a deep disagreement between us.
3   The Sole Agent Requirement in the Analysis 
of the Logical Form of Action Sentences
My account of the logical form of singular action sentences includes a sole agency 
requirement. This is clause (iii) of the analysis of [1] in [1a], repeated here.
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[1] I built a boat
[1a] There is an e, there is an f, there is a time t earlier than now, such that
(i) I am an agent of f at t,
(ii) f brings about e directly,
(iii) only I am an agent of any f ′ at any t ′ that brings about e directly and
(iv) e is a boat building
Blomberg maintains that (iii) is not a semantic requirement on the truth of [1]. When 
I assert [1], I merely implicate conversationally that I was the only agent directly 
contributing to the building of the boat. Thus, Blomberg would drop (iii) from the 
analysis of the logical form of [1], and correspondingly clause (iii) from [2c].
On my account, the distributive reading of plural action sentences does 
not follow from the collective reading. This is because for a singular action sen-
tence like “I lifted the bench” to be true, the agent must be the only direct agent 
of the bench going up. But the collective reading requires that there be many 
direct agents of the bench going up for it to be true. So no one of the members 
of the group is the sole direct agent of it going up. On Blomberg’s account, 
however, since the singular action sentence only says that the agent is a direct 
agent of the bench going up (not the only direct agent), and the plural action 
sentence on its collective reading says that there is an event of a bench going 
up of which each of us is a direct agent, it follows that for each of us there is an 
event of a bench going up of which he is a direct agent. Thus, on Blomberg’s 
view, the collective reading of plural action sentences entails the distributive 
reading.
Why does Blomberg think (iii) in [1a] is not a semantic requirement? 
 Blomberg says that [3] is true, presumably on the grounds that the anteced-
ent is semantically sufficient for the consequent, but it would not be if my 
account were correct. He says that [4] is not a contradiction, but it would be if 
my account were correct.
[3] Kirk wrote the book, if he wrote it with Ernie.
[4] Kirk wrote the book, but he didn’t write it on his own.
Furthermore, the conversation in [5] should sound weird if I am right, but 
 Blomberg says it is fine.
[5] A: Why did you not go to the morning meeting?
B: I prepared the lunch.
A: Did you do that on your own?
B: No, C and I prepared the lunch together.
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In contrast, I think [3] is clearly semantically false and [4] contradicts its first 
clause in the second. [4] could at best be read as a correction, taking it back, like 
saying, “I walked downtown, … but I didn’t walk all the way.” The conversation 
in [5] suggests you shouldn’t leave your wallet unattended around B. Contrast [3] 
and [4] with [6] and [7].
[6] If he wrote it with Ernie, he contributed to writing it but did not write it 
himself.
[7] If Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia together, then Russell did not write 
Principia himself/Whitehead did not write Principia himself.
On Blomberg’s view, [6] and [7] are contradictions. But in [6] and [7] the anteced-
ent entails the consequent. Perhaps Bomberg will say that “x wrote it himself” 
is not entailed by “x wrote it”. Surely, though, I wrote From Individual to Plural 
Agency iff I wrote it myself. If I wrote it myself, then I wrote it. And I if I wrote it, 
it was not written by somebody else. So if I wrote it, I wrote it myself. Suppose I 
say to someone: I wrote two books on collective action. He says: Did you write 
them yourself? I say, insulted: Are you deaf? I just told you I wrote them. Are you 
implying that I am lying? In any case, consider [8], which should be contradictory 
if Blomberg is right, but it is not.
[8] I didn’t write it, we did.
Change the example to a student paper rather than a book. A student, Billy, turns 
in a twenty-page paper you think he could not have written. You call him to your 
office. The conversation goes as in [9].
[9] You: Did you write the paper?
Billy: Yes.
You: What part of it did you write?
Billy: The first paragraph.
You: Who wrote the rest?
Billy: My roommate, Bud.
You: You didn’t write the paper. You only wrote the first paragraph. Writing 
the first paragraph is not the same as writing the paper. You get an “F.”
Does anyone want to maintain that Billy wrote the paper? Does Billy get to say: 
“Well, my roommate Bud said that he recently read a paper by Olle Blomberg and 
learned that if I made a contribution to writing the paper it follows that I literally 
wrote it. So I’m taking this to the Honor Court.” Now, consider a continuation of 
the conversation [5] in [5+].
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[5+] A: Why did you not go to the morning meeting?
B: I prepared the lunch.
A: Did you do that on your own?
B: No, C and I prepared the lunch together.
A: Ah, so you didn’t prepare the lunch after all, did you? You and C did it 
together. Why did you claim that you did it?
On Blomberg’s view, [5+] should sound weird, and A should sound deeply con-
fused, but it does not sound weird, and A is annoyed rather than confused. 
A  calls out B for claiming to do more than he did. Suppose the conversation 
continues in [5++].
[5++] B: I did too prepare the lunch!
A: What exactly did you do?
B: I prepared the salad.
A: Did lunch consist in just the salad?
B: No, there was roast beef and mashed potatoes and green beans and 
apple pie.
A: Who prepared those parts of the lunch?
B: C did.
A: Didn’t preparing the lunch consist in preparing the salad, roast beef, 
mashed potatoes, green beans, and apple pie?
B: Yes.
A: Did you do all of those things?
B: No. I told you. I only prepared the salad.
A: Exactly. You only prepared part of the lunch.
B: No, I didn’t only prepare part of the lunch, I also prepared the lunch (the 
salad, roast beef, mashed potatoes, green beans, and apple pie) because 
I prepared only part of it.
Now who is confused!
Let’s explore further whose account accommodates the linguistic data best.
Suppose that we are raising money for a charity by a walkathon. There are 
one hundred of us, and we each pledge to walk a mile for every sponsor we get. 
We each get ten sponsors. So together we walk 1000 miles for charity. Does [11] 
follow from [10]?
[10] We walked 1000 miles for charity.
[11] I walked 1000 miles for charity.
[12] I walked exactly 10 miles for charity.
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Obviously not. Indeed, in the situation described [12] is true, not [11]. [12] Is flatly 
inconsistent with [11]. But [11] follows from [10], on Blomberg’s account. Perhaps 
Blomberg would say that this is an example of the extreme hubris challenge, like 
claiming that you built the Great Wall of China when you laid a single brick, and 
that that’s why we react to the question whether [11] follows from [10] in the way 
we do. (But, really, did I build the Great Wall of China by laying a single brick?) 
However, that does not help with the fact that [12] is clearly true and incompatible 
with [11].
Change the example. I carry the bench from the ground floor to the first 
landing of the stairs. You carry it from the first landing to the first floor. [13] Is 
true. Does [14] follow from [13]?
[13] We carried the bench from the ground floor to the first floor.
[14] I carried the bench from the ground floor to the first floor.
No, obviously not. Indeed, [15] is true. But [14] and [15] are contradictory. For [16] 
is clearly true.
[15] I carried the bench only to the first landing and no further.
[16] If I carried the bench only to the first landing and no further, then I did not 
carry the bench from the ground floor to the first floor.
It is not extreme hubris for me to claim to have carried the bench to the first floor. 
That’s not the problem. The problem is that it is false that I did that, though it is 
true that we did it together. Let’s think about just lifting a bench. According to 
Blomberg, if we lift a bench together, we each lift a bench (I mean lift a bench 
completely off the ground). Is this true? Suppose that I pick up the left end of a 
bench, and the right end is still resting on the ground. Have I lifted a bench? No. 
I’ve lifted the left end of a bench. Suppose you come along and while I am holding 
the left end of the bench, you pick up the right. Then we have lifted a bench. Does 
it follow that I have now lifted a bench? Clearly, I only lifted the left end of the 
bench and did not lift the right end of the bench. But lifting the bench required 
that the left and right ends of the bench be lifted. So what I did is not sufficient 
for me to have lifted the bench.
Nigel voted for Brexit. 15,570,000 Pro-Brexit Britons voted for Brexit as well. 
[17] Is true. Does [18] follow given that Nigel is one of them?
[17] Pro-Brexit voters passed a referendum to leave the EU.
[18] Nigel passed a referendum to leave the EU.
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Someone who thinks [18] follows from [17] does not understand how voting 
works. Blomberg might respond to this by saying it is an instance of what he calls 
the institutional action challenge, but the pro-Brexit voters do not constitute an 
institution in the sense in which, say, the Supreme Court does. They don’t know 
each other. They are not as such organized for collective action. They operate 
largely independent of each other in voting. They have institutional roles but not 
as pro-Brexit voters.
In any case, the idea that the group agent account must be right for institu-
tional action sentences cannot be sustained. Presumably the idea is that in the 
case of institutional action sentences, the noun phrase introduces a group into 
the agency relation, rather than quantifying over its members. Leaving aside how 
nine justices on the Supreme Court are supposed to constitute a new agent, we 
can observe that this is incompatible with the linguistic data. In [19], the first 
clause is read collectively but the second distributively, but the noun phrase with 
its meaning is passed to the second clause without any change, since the elision is 
licit only when the meaning is the same across clauses. If ‘The Supreme Court’ is 
read distributively in the second clause, it is read distributively in the first clause. 
My account handles this, Blomberg’s suggestion does not. We can also reverse 
the order as in [20] where the first clause is distributive but the last is collective.
[19] The Supreme Court ruled on the case in the morning and then went their 
separate ways.
[20] The Supreme Court put on their robes, sat in judgement, and ruled on the 
case.
Blomberg notes that I also use examples of collective action verbs like “gather” 
and “meet” that don’t involve institutional agency to make the point the distribu-
tive reading of a collective action sentence does not follow from the collective 
reading. He admits this is a problem for his account. “Here there is clearly no 
additional (group) agent besides the individuals involved” (p. 20). But rather 
than giving up his view, he suggests that this “arguably shows that the scope of 
the multiple agents account is more limited than Ludwig takes it to be, not that 
the implicature account is mistaken” (p. 20). It is not quite clear what he means 
by this. He does not mean that there are group agents per se for gatherings or 
meetings. So I think he means it shows that clause (iii) in [2c] is appropriate only 
for noninstitutional collective action verbs (though even without (iii) the account 
is a multiple agents account). But in fact the problem is not with the plural action 
sentences but with the singular action sentences involving collective action verbs. 
“We gathered at the library” implies “I contributed to a gathering at the library” 
even if you add a requirement to the logical form of the plural action sentences 
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that all and only those among us are agents of the gathering. Since Blomberg 
is arguing that “I A-ed” means “I made a contribution to an A-ing”, one would 
expect the entailment to go through smoothly here. Blomberg must maintain that 
singular action sentences with non-institutional collective action verbs have a 
sole agency requirement. This is ad hoc. But it is also surprising. Why would a 
collective action verb trigger a special semantic rule that does not govern non-
collective action verbs that automatically made the singular action sentences 
containing it semantically false when their default meaning would make it true?
But it does not matter. As we’ve seen, the problems can’t be restricted to 
collective action verbs. We get the same problem with verbs that do not require 
multiple agents of the events they express. Change the example again. Does [22] 
follow from [21]?
[21] We surrounded the house.
[22] I surrounded the house.
Clearly not. But [22] does follow from [21] on Blomberg’s account. Blomberg might 
say that the verb here is collective. But it is not. Mr. Fantastic could surround the 
house by himself. A giant amoeba could surround the house. If it were a small 
enough house, I could surround it. So the verb is not collective. Thus, Blomberg 
is committed to [22] being true given that [21] is. But for ordinary houses, it is not 
true that I can surround the house.
Suppose my brother and I ate all the cookies before the party. There were thirty 
cookies. I ate ten of them and my brother ate twenty. Does [24] follow from [23]?
[23] We ate all the cookies.
[24] I ate all the cookies.
No. Clearly, [25] is true and [25] is incompatible with [24]. From [24] and the fact 
that there were thirty cookies [26] follows. (If we started with “We ate exactly 
thirty cookies” we could insert “exactly” after “ate” in [26]).
[25] I ate exactly ten cookies.
[26] I ate thirty cookies.
But [25] and [26] are jointly inconsistent. Worse, if I ate thirty cookies and there 
were only thirty cookies, it follows that my brother and I did not eat all the cookies 
because it follows from my eating thirty cookies and there being only thirty that 
my brother ate none, and if he ate none it follows that we did not eat the cookies, 
only I did.
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Consider a symphony orchestra performing Beethoven’s 7th Symphony. To 
perform the symphony, all the parts have to be played. I play the lead part for 
the French Horn. Have I performed Beethoven’s 7th Symphony? It is clear that you 
cannot perform Beethoven’s 7th Symphony just by playing the lead part for the 
French Horn. But on Blomberg’s account, I performed Beethoven’s 7th Symphony 
by playing the lead part for the French Horn. Is “performing a symphony” a col-
lective action verb? Maybe an orchestral performance is, but in principle someone 
with enough arms and mouths could perform a symphony by herself, and if we 
allow a performance to be pieced together by recording, even one person with 
enough versatility could play and record all the parts and play them back together.7
Examples can be multiplied. In each case, Blomberg’s account makes the 
wrong prediction and mine makes the right prediction. The problem is that if I 
have made only a partial contribution to bringing something about, that is the 
extent of what I have done. To say that I have done more is false. So to say I have 
done something when I only did part of it involves us in a manifest contradiction. 
Thus, to say that if a group does something, each member of the group ipso facto 
does it, commits (in Blomberg’s phrase) a fallacy of decomposition. The bottom 
line is that the collective reading of plural action sentences does not entail the 
distributive reading. My account explains why. Moreover, since it is an important 
distinction, we should expect our language to encode it, and it does. The right con-
clusion to draw is that (iii) in [1a] is a semantic requirement on the truth of [1], and 
(iii) in [2c] is likewise a semantic requirement on the truth of the collective reading 
of [2]. If Bill, Ted, and Rufus carry thirty boxes upstairs, and Bill carries 5, Ted 
carries 15, and Rufus carries 10, then Bill and Ted carried exactly 20 boxes upstairs, 
and they cannot claim to have carried all the boxes upstairs because that requires 
carrying 30 boxes upstairs and we’ve just said they did not do that. But Bill, Ted 
and Rufus did carry all the boxes upstairs. This is predicted by my account.
4   I-Intentions and Collective Actions
Blomberg argues that I can intend to do something while being neutral about 
whether I will do it myself or with others. Thus, I can intend to make dinner. If I 
make dinner by myself as a result of that intention, then I successfully carry it out. 
7 Sometimes it is true both that we did something and that each of us did something of the type 
we do together. If we are singing “Happy Birthday” together, each of us sings it individually as 
well. If we are applauding a performance together, each of us is applauding a performance. If we 
are walking together, each of us is walking. But this has to do with the type of collective action. 
It is not an entailment based on logical form because it matters what the meaning of the verb is.
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If I make dinner with you, or we make dinner together, then I likewise carry out my 
original intention. I disagree. This disagreement is not independent, however, of 
the disagreement about the sole agency requirement on singular action sentences. 
If Blomberg is right, then the intention to make dinner is simply an intention to be a 
direct contributor to a dinner making event. It leaves open whether there are one or 
more direct agents of it. However, I have just shown that singular action sentences 
do have a sole agency requirement. Thus, if I intend to make dinner, I intend I make 
dinner, and so that I am the sole agent of a dinner making in the sense required by 
the verb. If I am right about the sole agency requirement, this settles the matter.
Blomberg adduces some independent arguments for his position. In the two 
assassins example, say Agent 13 and Agent 47 both intend to kill Dr. Otto Wolfgang 
Ort-Meyer by poisoning him, but are not aware of the plans of the other. They both 
poison him and he dies as a result of the double dose of poison. Were their inten-
tions carried out successfully? I say that they misfired because of the sole agency 
requirement of singular action sentences. Each intended that he be the sole direct 
agent of Ort-Meyer’s death. Neither was fully successful. Blomberg argues:
… hold fixed an agent’s intention and causal contribution to an intended outcome. We then 
replace the causal contributions made by other agents who intend to bring about the same 
outcome with similar non-agential causal contributions. Here, I think it would be odd to 
say that the agent failed in doing what he intended before the replacement, but that he suc-
ceeded after it. If the agent succeeded after the replacement, then he arguably did so before 
the replacement as well. (p. 22)
Why would it be odd though, if “I poison Ort-Meyer” requires me to be the sole 
direct agent of the death?8 You might protest: but was not the assassins’ goal, 
namely, the death of Ort-Myer, something which each achieved? Yes, but this is 
not enough for their intentions to have been successfully carried out, as we know 
from cases of deviant causal chains. So we cannot infer from the execution of the 
intention bringing about the event expressed by the action verb that the intention 
was successfully carried out.
5   Conclusion
(1) Blomberg brings out an important point about the relation of simple primi-
tive actions to composite primitive actions which can be the values of “f ” in the 
8 This needn’t detain us here, but I think it is not clear that this case is not one of a deviant 
causal chain of a sort, for the assassin’s conception of how the death is brought about embedded 
in his plan of action is not correct even if the poison is not introduced by another agent.
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account of the logical form of action sentences. This requires us to draw dis-
tinctions that were not clearly drawn in the book. This does not alter the basic 
account, but it calls for a refinement. What is the bearing of this on the question 
whether there are collective actions “in the primary sense”? There are similari-
ties and differences between individuals and groups when the individuals and 
groups do things. There is something that the group does but not by doing any-
thing else, namely, mereological sums of the simple primitive actions of their 
members. There are composites of these as well. However, in the ordinary case, 
no single agent stands in the primitive agency relation to those mereological 
sums and composites. Those are the facts. As long as we agree on the description 
of the phenomena that guides its application, the question of how to use “collec-
tive primitive action” is verbal rather than substantive. This is not to say that there 
are no considerations that can be brought to bear. I still think what I said in the 
book is right:
On balance, it seems best to dispense with the terminology of primitive actions when it 
comes to group actions. The best candidate is too distant from what counts in the individual 
case for it to warrant the literal use of the term, and its use in the extended sense invites 
misunderstanding. (Ludwig 2016, p. 176)
It would be a consideration in favor of using “collective primitive action”, even 
if not decisive, if it turned out that the category Blomberg has in mind could be 
shown to have an important distinctive explanatory role in our understanding of 
collective action. Even if this were so, it wouldn’t be decisive, since “the sum(s) of 
their primitive actions” would keep track of it as well as “their collective primitive 
actions” and have the advantage of being more transparent.
(2) Blomberg suggests that singular action sentences don’t semantically 
encode a sole agent requirement. If this is right, then the collective reading of 
plural action sentences entails the distributive reading. But this runs into sys-
tematic trouble. The trouble is that we recognize that saying you did exactly this 
much of something (that falls short of the whole) but no more is not compatible 
with saying you did it. This is well illustrated by the example our eating exactly 
thirty cookies together by my eating exactly ten and your eating exactly twenty. 
If I ate exactly ten, I did not eat exactly thirty. Cases in which one simply can’t (as 
a matter of fact) do the thing that group one is a part of does bring this out also. 
We surrounded the house but I did not. The collective reading of plural action 
sentences does not entail the distributive reading. The sole agency requirement 
blocks this entailment. It is a semantic requirement on singular action sentences 
that the subject agent is the only agent of the relevant sort of the consequent 
event.
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(3) This settles the question whether one can have an I-intention that is suc-
cessfully executed if I do not do what I intend by myself (in the relevant way). It 
may seem that you can hit what you aim at even if unbeknownst to you someone 
else is aiming at the same in the same way and it is overdetermined, but it can 
seem that you hit what you are aiming at in deviant causal chain cases as well, 
but nonetheless something goes wrong.
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